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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CRANE CO., a corporation,
Plaintiff amd Appellant,

-vs.UTAH MOTOR PARK,
INCORPORATED,
a corporation,
DefendCIIYbt and Respondent

Case
No. 8713

Respondent's Brief
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts set forth by appellant is
substantially correct, but we feel that the issues raised
by the Answer should be stated and one or two additional
facts shown.
Defendant, in paragraph 2 of its Answer (R3) denied that it entered into a contract with Walsh for the
construction, addition or repair of a building or buildings as alleged in paragraph IV of the Complaint (Rl);
but on the other hand alleged its transaction with Walsh
was for the purchase of a boiler which had theretofore
1
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been sold to Walsh by the plaintiff (Crane). Defendant
also denied that. plaintiff (Crane) furnished the boiler to
defenda;n.t at the insta;n.ce of Walsh, as alleged in paragraph VI of the Complaint (R2), but on the other hand
alleged in paragraph 4 of the Answer that the boiler was
sold to defenda;n.t by Walsh, the then owner thereof with
full right to sell the same.
There were other defenses alleged but the pre-trial
hearing had not proceeded to a consideration of those
matters, and, of course, no trial was had because, upon
presentation of the invoice (Exhibit 1) the trial court
held that plaintiff had by its own evidence failed to establish a case, and had in fact established the defense
alleged by defendant.
Counsel states, which is a fact, that plaintiff (Crane)
recommended to defendant that it purchase the boiler
from Wa.lsh. Plaintiff (Crane Co.) also expressly
directed how the transaction had to be handled; viz., as
a sale by it (Crane) to Walsh and as a re-sale by Walsh
to defendant (R8, 9).
Also, as a part of the pre-trial hearing it was expressly admitted by plaintiff (Crane Co.) that prior to
sale of the boiler to defendant it (Crane) passed title to
Walsh (R6). We quote from the record:
"THE CouRT: I think that ends the lawsuit.
I think the document itself shows that it was a sale
to Walsh and that the company having parted with
their title would not be able to follow it past the
man they sold it to, into the Utah Motor Park's
improvement.
2
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MR. RicH: That's what the sales act says too.
THE CouRT : Yes.
MR. BoYER: I don't think there is any question about that, but we can't follow - that we
passed the title, and it went into your place. There
is no question about that. The same thing would
be true in every case where you have got a mechanic's lien. The title passes to the stuff that
goes into the place, to the plumber, to the workman or whoever the man is, the mechanic who is
doing the job.
THE CouRT: You have to sell at retail to do
that, don't you 1

MR. BoYER: I don't think so.
THE CouRT: There has to be a sales tax collected on it.
(Discussion)
MR. RicH: I move to dismiss the case, for
summary judgment.''
Thereupon, the motion to dismiss and for summary
judgment was granted.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. The Court properly dismissed Plaintiff's complaint because :
(a) Plaintiff's evidence showed Walsh Plumbing
Company, from whom defendant purchased the boiler, to
be a retailer, not a contractor; and

3
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(b) Plaintiff's evidence showed that at the time the
boiler was acquired by defendant, plaintiff had parted
with title; hence could not have been the one that furnished it to defendant.

ARGUMENT
(a) PLAINTIFF'S

EVIDENCE SHOWED
WALSH PLUMBING COMPANY, FROM WHOM DEFENDANT PURCHASED THE BOILER, TO BE A
RETAII_JER, NOT A CONTRACTOR.
It was the decision of the trial court, and we respectfully submit that it is sound law, that the statute in
question here was intended to cover the relationship of
contractor and materialman, not the relationship of
wholesaler and retailer, as evidenced in this case by the
endorsement on the invoice.
Utah has three statutes, all somewhat related, for
the protection of materialmen who furnish materials to
contractors, to be included in the owner's property pursuant to a contract for the erection or repair of a building. They are: The Mechanics Lien Law, Title 38, Chapter 1; the law relating to Public Contracts, Title 14, Chapter 1; and the law relating to Private Contracts, Title 14,
Chapter 2. In Hach and all of those laws the basic relationship that has to be established to come within the
benefits of the protective provisions of the law, is that of
contractor and materialman.

4
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Those statutes were never intended to, and do not
cover other types of relationships pertaining to the handling and sale of personal property.
Building materials, heating and air-conditioning
equipment, lighting equipment, roofing, paint, doors,
awnings, windows, hot water tanks, boilers, bricks, machinery, wallpaper and all types of fixtures may, when
included within the purview of a building contract, become lienable items when furnished to a contractor by a
materialman. But the same type of equipment may also
be purchased at retail from any of the many retailers
handling those items. We have no doubt the members of
this Court will take judicial notice of the fact that lumber,
doors, windows, cement and all types of building materials may be purchased at retail direct from the lumber
yards and mills; and that all types of appliances and
equipment may be purchased at retail in Z. C. M. I., Sears,
and any one of the many retail stores handling he a ti:Jlg
equipment, appliances, and other types of "ready-forinstallation'' improvements for the home or farm.
Had it been intended by the Legislature that persons
purchasing materials and equipment at retail from a
retailer had to take out a bond to protect the wholesaler
or jobber and other middlemen in the chain of title back
to the manufacturer, it would have so stated in clear
language; and it would also have provided for the
retailer to give a sworn affidavit to the purchaser setting
forth the name of the wholesaler or jobber from whom
it was originally purchased, together with a statement

5
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showing the status of its account with the wholesaler.
The ridiculous situation thus resulting from an attempt
to apply this law to a retailer-wholesaler relationship is
evident.
A contractor-materialman relationship stands on an
entirely different basis. In that relationship the materialman. is the retailer and the· contractor is the user or consumer, as the sales tax law clearly states.
It is no longer an open question in this State as to
the status of the contractor as the consumer, so far as
the sales tax is concerned. It was thoroughly discussed
and decided in Utah Concrete Products Corp. v. State
Tax Commission, 101 Utah 513, 125 Pac. 2d 408. It was
unanimously held that the contractor is the user or consumer not a retailer, as shown in Exhibit 1. The Supreme
·Court o:f Arizona, citing the above Utah case as authority,
gave the unanswerable reason for the rule in Duhame v.
State Taa; Com.mission, 179 Pac. 2d 252, in the following language :

"* * * While perhaps a contractor may be making
a sale in the loose sense of the word, and while,
in that loose sense it might also be a sale at retail,
he is certainly not making a sale at retail of tangible personal property which is the necessary
meaning of the term 'sale' when used in this Act.
By the definitions in this Act a contractor 'vhen
fabricating personalty into realty neither sells,
resells, sells at retail, nor can he be considered a
retailer.''
If, therefore, Walsh had been a contractor for defendant, as plaintiff now alleges in paragraphs IV and VI
6
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of the complaint in an attempt to bring this transaction
within the scope of this law, the plaintiff (Crane Co.)
would have been liable to the State of Utah for sales tax
on the transaction. If, on the other hand, the transaction was, as found by the trial court, and as shown by
the invoice (Exhibit 1), a wholesaler-retailer transaction, then Walsh was a retailer, not a contractor, and
Crane Company was a wholesaler selling to a retaile.r,
not a materialman selling to a contractor.
The stamped endorsement on the invoice is the statutory form outlined in Sec. 59-15-2 (c) and (d) for identification of the wholesaler-retailer relationship.

A contractor is defined by our statute ( 58-6-3) as one
who for a fee undertakes to construct, alter or repair
buildings, etc. The fee represents the skill, responsibility
and integrity of the contractor in producing the final
result, and is the pay of the contractor for services rendered. On the other hand, a retailer sells for a given sales
price and the difference between the sales price and the
cost is profit- not a fee for services.
Counsel quotes from two Utah cases: Liberty Coal
and Lumber Co. v. Snow, 53 Utah 298, 178 Pac. 341, and
Rio Grande Lumber Co. v. Darke, 50 Utah 114, 167 Pac.
241. We have no quarrel with the law announced in those
cases. In each of them the contractor relationship to the
owner was undisputed - in fact admitted. The cases had
to do with other points of law. If, on the other hand,
Mr. Darke and Mr. Snow had purchased the materials
from Rio Grande Lumber Co., and Liberty Coal & Lum7
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her Co., respectively, at retail, and paid for it to the
retailer, and then some wholesaler, jobber or manufacturer had tried to sue them for failure to get a bond from
Rio Grande Lumber and Liberty Coal Co., as retailers,
the result would, we are confident, have been different.
The status of this transaction was determined as of
the time when it occurred, when Crane Co. stamped the
invoice and made the sale. It cannot now be switched
back to suit the advantage of Crane Co.
Crane Company is a distributor of builders' hardware and appliances. Many sales by it are undoubtedly
made to retailers. It also, undoubtedly, makes sales in
substantial volume to contractors for incorporation into
building projects. On sales to retailers Crane Company
pays no sales tax, passes title to the retailer and the
retailer has any lien right that may exist as materialman.
On sales to contractors, Crane Company is a retailer,
pays the sales tax to the State as a retailer under our
law, and in that case Crane Company has the lien right
as materialman. In the case at bar Crane Company chose
to be a wholesaler and not a materialman.
Having taken the position at the time of sale that
Walsh was a. reta;iler making a sale of personal property
to defendant, "Te respectfully submit that the trial court
was correct in its decision that such status controls now
and destroys this cause of action.
(b) PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE SHOWED THAT
AT THE TIME THE BOILER WAS ACQUIRED BY

8
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DEFENDANT, PLAINTIFF HAD PARTED WITH
TITLE; HENCE COUL·D NOT HAVE BEEN THE
ONE THAT FURNISHED IT TO DEFENDANT.
Under the Sales Act, Sec. 60-2-3 (Rule 1) the title to
personal property sold by a wholesaler to a retailer for
resale passes to the retailer when the contract is made.
The attorney for plaintiff did not dispute this. In
fact, he admitted it (R. 6). If title passed to Walsh, then
Walsh was the one that would have the right to protection as materialman, as otvner of the property, under
whatever laws, statutes, or agreement as might be involved for its protection. Walsh was the third party of
whom this court was speaking in the Liberty Coal case.
This very question was before the California Court
in Harris & Stunston, Inc. v. Yorba Linda Citrus Ass'n,
26 Pac. 2d 654. California has incorporated its Mechanic's Lien Laws into one composite law, but, as stated by
this court in Rio Grarnde Lumber Co. v. Da.rke, supra,
cited by appellant, its essential features are the same as
our statutes. In the Harris case, above, the plaintiff, a
wholesaler, had sold some water softeners to one W. F.
Cruller, a plumber, who in turn sold them to the named
defendant. Plaintiff, the wholesaler, then filed a lien
against defendant's property and tried to take the position that it, the wholesaler, was a materialman and that
Cruller, the retailer, was a contractor- exactly the thing
the Crane Company is trying to do in this case. The trial
court found that Cruller was a seller, not a contractor,

9
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and the wholesaler appealed. We quote from the decision
sustaining the trial court as follows :
"The appellant contends that one W. F.
Cruller was a subcontractor employed to do
plumbing and similar work on the buildings in
question; that he was the statutory agent of the
respondent within the meaning of section 1183
of the Code of Civil Procedure; and that it furnished these softeners to Cruller as such agent. It
is respondent's contention that Cruller, in furnishing the water softeners, was not a subcontractor
but was himself a materialman. The court found
that Cruller sold the water softeners to the respondent at an agreed price and installed them
upon the property; that the water softeners when
sold to the respondent were the property of
Cruller ; that the respondent paid Cruller in full;
that nothing was due to the appellant on account
of said water softeners ; and that the respondent
was not entitled to a lien. It was further found
that the appellant, through its authorized agents,
induced and requested the respondent to purchase
these water softeners from Cruller; that in reliance upon this the respondent in good faith purchased the same from Cruller; and that Cruller acted as a materialman in selling the machines
to the respondent.

*
*
*
*
*
''Cruller testified that he was in the wholesale plumbing and heating business; that he maintained a store ; that among other things, he handled water softeners; that he sold these softeners
to the respondent and installed them ; that he
bought them from the appellant and sold them to
the respondent; that the appellant billed him for
them and he billed them to the respondent; that
the respondent had paid him in full; that he was
later forced into bankruptcy; that he had had sim10

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ilar water softeners on display in his store for
seven or ten years before this time; that he had
previously bought 'vater softeners from the appellant and sold them to other parties ; that this
deal was handled in all respects similar to prior
transactions except that these softeners were
shipped direct to the respondent's place of business instead of being sent to his store and then
reshipped; and that in all other cases the appellant had not attempted to collect direct from his
customers. It appears that the water softeners
were sold by Cruller to the respondent at an
agreed price and that an additional amount was
paid for their installation. While the latter
amount does not appear, the evidence indicates
that it was only a. fraction of the purchase price.
''We think this evidence supports the findings
and conclusions of the trial court and that the
same may not be disturbed. It seems clear that
this case belongs to that class where a finished
article is sold, the installation thereof being merely incidental and a. part of the deli very. Under
such circumstances the trial court correctly held
that Cruller was a materialman and not a subcontractor acting as the agent of the owner.'' (Emphasis added)
We respectfully submit that under the undisputed
evidence in this case as shown by the plaintiff's invoice
presented at the pre-trial conference, the trial court correctly ruled that plaintiff was not a materialman, but
was a wholesaler, and that Walsh was not a contractor but
a retailer, and that defendant was not liable to plaintiff.
Respectfully submitted,
RICH, EL.TON & MANGUM
And H. WRIGHT VOL,KER
Attorneys for Defen.dG!Yd
11
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